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Nuclear Waste and Native America:
The MRS Siting Exercise*
M. V. Rajeev Gowda & Doug Easterling**
Introduction
The U.S. government's quest to store high-level nuclear waste has
had many interesting twists and turns. One set of developments stands
out as unique - efforts to site a temporary Monitored Retrievable
Storage (MRS) facility on lands belonging to Native Americans. We
describe the history and logic of the government's process which led to
the involvement of Native Americans and the reactions of some tribes
to the MRS option. We also provide cross-cultural perspectives on issues
such as risk perception and equity and consider various policy dilemmas
raised by efforts to site a nuclear waste storage facility on Native
American lands.
The History and Logic of the MRS Siting Process
As part of its efforts to support the development of the nuclear
energy industry, the U.S. government took responsibility for
establishing a storage site for high-level nuclear wastes (spent fuel in
particular) by January 1998. It has long tried to site both a permanent
geologic repository and an above-ground MRS facility for interim
storage I of spent fuel. During the 1970's, the Atomic Energy
* A version of this paper was presented to the Association for Public Policy Analysis
and Management. We thank Rob Anex, Catherine Blaha, Rick Farmer, Will Focht,
Morris Foster, Jeff Fox, Steve Galpin, Tom James, Howard Kunreuther, Paula Long,
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** Rajeev Gowda is Research Fellow in the Science and Public Policy Program and
Assistant Professor, Political Science, at the University of Oklahoma. He holds a
Ph.D. (Public Policy and Management) from the Wharton School, University of
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gowda@ou.edu. Doug Easterling is Director, Research and Evaluation, Colorado
Trust. He received a Ph.D. (Public Policy & Management) from the Wharton School
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1 An MRS facility stores spent fuel above ground for a relatively short period of
time. It serves as a way station in the transfer of spent fuel from nuclear reactors
(where the fuel rods are held either in temporary storage pools or above-ground casks)
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Commission and the Department of Energy employed traditional
siting procedures 2 to locate a permanent repository. This strategy was
revised in 1982 when Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA) 3 which provided a comprehensive policy for dealing with
the nuclear waste problem, including "science-based" approaches to
siting both a repository and an MRS facility. However, strong public
and political opposition limited the practical viability of the NWPA. 4
In response, Congress amended the NWPA in 19875 to create a
bifurcated approach around the siting impasse. The permanent
repository was to be sited by Congressional fiat,6 while a voluntary
process was stipulated for the MRS facility. Further, no MRS facility
could be built until a permanent repository was issued a license.
In theory, a voluntary siting approach holds much promise. Ideally,
a developer would not unilaterally select a site, but rather invite all
communities with technically suitable locations to enter into
negotiations. When a community decided it was interested (e.g.,
through a referendum), its designated representatives would work with
the developer to craft a mutually acceptable facility proposal. This
proposal would stipulate a site for the facility, the conditions under
which the facility would operate, and the nature of the benefits to be
awarded to the host community. If more than one community were
interested, the developer would select the site that was most attractive
on some grounds (e.g., lowest cost, minimal risk). The voluntary
approach was thus expected to satisfy the criterion of economic
efficiency. It was also expected to address the main non-economic
to the geologic repository. Various designs have been suggested for MRS facilities, but
in all cases te wastes are isolated through engineered, rather than geologic, barriers.
2 Le., decide-announce-defend.
3 See Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Star. 22002 (1983)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (1983)).
4 See Luther J. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and the Public Trust: Dealing with
Radioactive Waste (1987); Doug Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of
Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository (1995); Amy McCabe & Michael
Fitzgerald, Prospects for Monitored Retrievable Storage of High-Level Nuclear
Waste, 10 Pol'y Stud. Rev. 167 (1992); Brent E. Sigmon, Achieving a Negotiated
Compensation Agreement in Siting: the MRS Case, 6 J. Pol'y Anal. & Mgmt. 170
(1987).
5 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Atat. 1330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (1987)).
6 Yucca Mountain, NV, was designated as the only site to be considered.
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obstacles to the siting of noxious facilities: adverse perceptions of the
risks involved (heightened due to a perceived lack of control), lack of
community participation, lack of trust in the managers of the facilities,
and concerns over the fairness of both the procedures used to choose
sites and the eventual outcomes.
7
The voluntary siting process for the MRS facility was to be
implemented by the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator that was
specially created by the 1987 amendments to the NWPA. 8 The
Negotiator was authorized to seek states, counties, or Native American
Nations that might be interested in hosting such a facility in return for
monetary and other compensation. As a baseline, Congress authorized
the host state or nation to receive $5 million per year prior to the
shipment of waste and $10 million per year during the operational
phase of the MRS facility. 9 The Negotiator was free to negotiate a
benefits package well in excess of these figures.
The specific process used to find "volunteer" sites for the MRS
facility was crafted by the first Negotiator, David Leroy.10 During his
tenure as Negotiator, Leroy fashioned a siting process that was guided
by the following principles: (1) the process must be truly voluntary, (2)
requests for information and preliminary discussion would not be
viewed as a commitment to proceed further, and (3) all dialogues were
terminable at the will of the prospective host.1 1 Before Leroy would
consider a state, county, or tribe as a potential host for an MRS facility,
he required the jurisdiction's elected representatives to invite
negotiations. A state would be considered as a candidate for a facility
only if the governor explicitly endorsed the request. Counties also
could make such a request, but Leroy would negotiate with a county
only if the governor of the respective state assented to the local request;
7 See Hazardous Waste Siting and Democratic Choice (Don Munton ed., 1996);
Barry G. Rabe, Beyond NIMBY Hazardous Waste Siting in Canada and the United
States (1994).
8 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987.
9 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 § 171.
10 Although the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was authorized in 1987,
the position went unfilled until June 1990 when President Bush appointed David
Leroy, the former Lieutenant Governor of Idaho.
11 See Office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator, 1991 Annual Report to Congress
(1992).
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the governor retained the right to take the county out of consideration.
A Native American tribe would be considered only if a request came
from the elected representatives of the tribe. Leroy also would allow
interested jurisdictions to opt out at any time up until a proposal was
submitted to Congress. According to Leroy, communities had an
"unfettered right to say 'no'. " 12
The specific level and form of the benefits provided to a host state
or tribe would be determined through negotiations with Leroy, subject
to congressional approval. Grants could be obtained for such purposes
as infrastructure improvement, cleanup of environmental problems,
educational assistance programs, economic development, and
recreational facilities. Although Leroy acknowledged that the
availability of benefits provided key leverage, he took pains to avoid the
perception that he was "buying" the host community. He asserted that
"affected stakeholders must satisfy themselves on all conceivable issues
of safety, control, technology, and acceptability." 13 Leroy emphasized
the variety of non-monetary incentives available and stressed the
importance of fully dealing with safety concerns before discussing
economic benefits. He guaranteed that:
the choice of technology is negotiable. So are oversight
controls, size and time limitations, operating parameters,
fees and facility ownership.... The host will have a powerful,
if not controlling, influence on how it proposes to address
this national problem.14
Finally, Leroy recognized the importance of providing communities
with the means to investigate and develop their interests in hosting an
MRS facility. "Study grants" were offered to allow communities a way
to investigate the risks and benefits of hosting an MRS facility without
making a committment. These were divided into three phases. Phase I
grants of $100,000 gave the community an opportunity to learn about
the technical aspects of high-level waste storage and to determine
whether there was a real interest in hosting the facility. Phase II-A
12 David H. Leroy, The Challenge of Beginning- Questions and Answers About
Negotiated Nuclear Facility Siting in the 1990's, speech to 3d Ann. Int'l High Level
Radioactive Waste Management Conference, (Las Vegas, NV, Apr. 13, 1992).
13 David H. Leroy, Federalism on Your Terms: An Invitation for Dialogue,
Government to Government, speech to the National Congress of American Indians
(S.F., Cal., Dec. 4, 1991).
14 Leroy, supra note 12, at 15-16.
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grants provided $200,000, and required a more focused investigation of
potential sites and local response. Phase II-B grants provided a much
higher level of support ($2,800,000), but called for still deeper studies
and required the community to confer with the Negotiator. 15 No
strings were attached to these grants, and they were staged to move
interested communities toward commitment.
The Process at Work in States and Counties
Leroy's overtures were met with resounding silence by the nation's
governors. The political, environmental, and ideological connotations of
hosting a nuclear waste storage facility overshadowed any possible
economic benefits under the Negotiator's program. Still, elected
officials from four counties: Grant County, North Dakota; Fremont
County, Wyoming; San Juan County, Utah; and Apache County,
Arizona, submitted applications for Phase I study grants. At least four
other counties were interested in applying for a grant, but were blocked
from doing so by their governors. 16 Leroy also received a handful of
other "serious inquiries" that did not translate into applications for
study grants. 17
The Negotiator approved Phase I study grants for three of the four
counties that applied: Grant, Fremont, and San Juan. The Grant
County study, however, never went forward. Although all three county
commissioners supported the application, the citizens of Grant County
had not been formally consulted. When it became known that Grant
County had been awarded a grant, an angry electorate recalled all three
commissioners. Although they kept the $100,000 grant, the new
commissioners terminated any further study of an MRS facility. 1 8
High levels of opposition surfaced throughout Wyoming and Utah,
and overwhelmed the interest expressed by the sparsely populated
applicant counties. Although the respective governors had initially
consented to allow counties to apply for study grants, they each refused
to allow the process to advance to more serious levels of negotiation. 19
15 See Office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator, 1992 Annual Report to Congress
(1993).
16 See id.; Jim Carrier, Tribe Mulls Nuclear Dump, Deny. Post, Apr. 14, 1993, at
Al; Keith Rogers, Miller Predicts Problems If Officials Pursue Nuke Bid, Las Vegas
Rev.J., Oct. 17, 1991, atAl.
17 See Office of Nuclear Waste Negotiator, supra note 15.
18 See id.
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 229 [Summer 1998]
Seeking Volunteers in Native American Country
The lack of receptivity on the part of the nation's governors severely
compromised whatever hopes for success might have been associated
with the Negotiator's voluntary siting process. Not only were the
governors unwilling to enter into any communication with the
Negotiator, they also thwarted any meaningful participation on the part
of those counties that expressed even a preliminary interest in hosting
an MRS facility. The only entities left for the Negotiator to approach,
therefore, were Native American nations. Although governors had the
statutory authority to veto county participation in the Negotiator's
program, Native American nations enjoyed a level of sovereignty that
precluded interference from state-level officials. 20
The issue of sovereignty assumed a high profile in Leroy's overtures
to Native Americans. In a 1991 speech, Leroy invited tribal leaders "to
dictate their own terms" for hosting an MRS facility. 2 1 While
avoiding any obvious overtures to "target" Native Americans for an
MRS facility, the Negotiator's Office spent much of its time
responding to the interest that various tribal councils showed in
acquiring economic benefits in return for hosting the facility.22
19 Mike Sullivan, Letter to Fremont County Commissioners Refusing to Allow
Them to Proceed with the Siting of an MRS, (Aug. 21, 1992); Michael Leavitt, Policy
Statement by Governor Leavitt on Monitored Retrievable Storage (Salt Lake City,
UT: Office of Governor, 1993).
20 The actual scope of tribal sovereignty has been the subject of considerable debate
in the courts, especially on matters such as gambling and taxation, it remains unclear
whether tribes may fully ignore the laws of the states in which they are located.
However, in the case of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, state officials had no
jurisdiction over the arrangements that tribes formed with the Negotiator.
21 David H. Leroy, Moving Beyond the Headlines: Negotiated Nuclear Facility
Siting in the 1990's, speech to the 2d Ann. Int'l High Level Radioactive Waste
Management Conference (Las Vegas, NV, Apr. 30, 1991).
22 During the tenure of the Negotiator's Office, a total of 24 Indian tribes applied
for study grants. Phase I grant applications were submitted by 20 tribes. Of these, 17
were approved by the Negotiator. However, four of the approved applications (the
Chickasaw, Sac and Fox, Absentee Shawnee, and Caddo Tribes - all in Oklahoma)
were withdrawn before funds were issued.
After studying the advantages and disadvantages of hosting an MRS, 8 of the 13
tribes that received Phase I study grants dropped out of the process. This left the
Mescalero Apache Tribe (New Mexico), the Prairie Island Community (Minnesota),
the Skull Valley Band of the Goshutes (Utah), the Eastern Shawnee Tribe
(Oklahoma), and the Fort McDermitt Paiute/Shoshone Tribe (Oregon and Nevada)
to proceed to Phase II-A, where another $200,000 in grants was available. Four other
tribes that by-passed Phase I also applied for Phase II-A grants: Miami Tribe
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A total of 24 tribes applied for study grants, with 20 coming into
the process during Stage I and four others during Stage II-A. However,
only a fraction of these represented serious interest on the part of the
applicant tribes. For example, among the 20 applications for Stage I
grants, three were rejected by the Negotiator, four others were
withdrawn by the tribe before funds were disbursed, and eight others
dropped out of the process shortly after receiving their Phase I funds.
This left only five of the initial 20 applicants to move onto Stage II-A
(although four others ente.red into the process at that point). In the end,
only four tribes - the Mescalero Apache of New Mexico, the Skull
Valley Goshute of Utah, the Tonkawa of Oklahoma, and the Fort
McDermitt Tribe of Oregon and Nevada - remained committed to
the MRS facility as they explored the opportunity in greater depth. In
August 1993, the Mescalero Apache Tribe submitted an application for
a Phase II-B grant stating that it was ready to begin "credible, formal
discussions" regarding hosting the MRS facility. A second application
for a Phase II-B grant was submitted by the Skull Valley Goshutes who
wanted to volunteer a site near the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah.
The interest expressed by Native American tribes, particularly the
Mescalero Apache, raised significant concern on the part of state
officials. The prospect of an MRS facility in central New Mexico was
extremely unpopular among the non-Native American population of
the state, especially since New Mexico was already the host of another
nuclear waste repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Project near
Carlsbad for "transuranic" waste. 2 3 Because state officials had no
authority to intervene in the negotiations, they sought another approach
to block the Mescaleros from pursuing an MRS facility. Senator Jeff
Bingaman (D-N.M.) sponsored legislation that would have required
interested tribes to gain the cooperation of state and local officials
before receiving study grant funds. Congress went further and voted to
cancel the entire study-grant program in October 1993.24
(Oklahoma), Ute Mountain Ute Tribe (Colorado), Tonkawa Tribe (Oklahoma), and
Northern Arapaho Tribe (Wyoming).
23 Le., plutonium and other "atomically heavy" by-products of the nuclear weapons
production process.
24 See Western Interstate Energy Board, Mescalero Apache Tribe, W. Energy
Update, Oct. 22, 1993, at 18.
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Even without the prospect of study grants, the Skull Valley Band of
Goshute, the Fort McDermitt Tribe, and the Tonkawa continued to
work with the Negotiator to put together proposals for the facility.2 5
Leroy served as Negotiator until June 1993, when the Clinton
administration appointed Richard Stallings, a former Congressman
from Idaho, in his place. Stallings remained in office until authorization
for the Negotiator expired in December 1994. Congress failed to
reauthorize the office not because the voluntary siting process was
deemed a failure, but rather because it appeared that a volunteer might
actually be found. The Mescalero Apache tribe in New Mexico was
close to volunteering to host an MRS facility despite the objections of
state officials. Members of the New Mexico Congressional delegation
led an effort to gut the Negotiator's office to prevent the Mescaleros
from proceeding.
As the Negotiator's Office lost its power, the Mescalero Apache and
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute began working outside the
Negotiator's process with a private consortium of utilities headed by
Northern States Power Company. These utilities had doubts that a
federal MRS facility would be built in time to meet the federally
mandated 1998 deadline for the acceptance of spent fuel by the
government. If the federal effort failed, a private MRS facility could
serve as a backup.26 While the utility consortium's negotiations with
the Mescalero Apache broke down over the financial terms involved,2 7
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute were still considering nuclear waste
storage. The consortium applied for a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
license to proceed with such a facility. In response, Utah established the
Office of High Level Nuclear Waste Storage Opposition to counter the
consortium's efforts. 28
25 See Jeff Banard, Tribe Considers Storing Nuclear Waste, Reno Gazette J., June
16, 1994, at B4.
26 See Heather Border & Clyde Weiss, Tribes Signs Pact for Temporary Nuclear
Waste Dump, Las Vegas Rev. J., Feb. 5, 1994, at B6.
27 See Northern States Power Co., New Release, Apr. 18, 1996.
28 See Office of High Level Nuclear Waste Storage Opposition, Opposition to
High Level Nuclear Waste Storage (Salt Lake City, UT: Department of
Environmental Quality, 1997).
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Native American Reactions to the Process
Given that the MRS siting process came to center almost exclusively
on Native American communities, it is important to consider the
reactions of these communities to the MRS siting effort. Their reactions
were tremendously diverse, both intra and inter tribes. The Mescalero
Apache and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute, for example, stand out
as exceptions in being willing to consider hosting an MRS-type facility,
with or without federal government involvement. On the other hand,
most tribes were opposed to hosting the MRS facility even with the
accompanying economic incentives. Less than 5% of the eligible tribes
applied for study grants. Moreover, many of the tribes that did apply
were not really interested in hosting an MRS facility. For example, the
Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma returned the Phase I study grant that
it had applied for and had been awarded after a majority of its
members opposed any involvement.
In the remaining sections, we discuss various Native American
reactions to the MRS siting initiative and highlight how the Native
American experience with the MRS process differs from the more
typical siting controversies encountered in Anglo-American
communities. Our discussion is organized around several of the key
factors affecting siting decisions: perceptions of risk, trust, procedural
equity, and distributional equity.2 9 We draw on a number of
references to understand how these issues play out among Native
Americans, and in particular, to describe the Mescalero Apache's
experience with the MRS process. In addition, our analysis draws on a
set of structured interviews with sixteen members of the Sac and Fox
Nation (and one telephone interview). The Sac and Fox case provides
an opportunity to understand the nature of the objections that emerged
within one particular tribe that chose not to pursue the opportunity to
consider an MRS facility.
Risk Perception
The widespread perception of danger that often accompanies
nuclear waste storage facilities serves as one of the central factors in
triggering opposition to nuclear waste siting efforts. As with Anglo-
29 See Doug Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-
Level Nuclear Waste Repository (1995).
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Americans, the risks were largely the reason Native Americans opposed
MRS facilities. Regardless of the integrity of the facility, Native
Americans believed there would be a high risk to their people and their
land.
There is reason to believe that Native Americans are even more
concerned about the risks associated with an MRS than Anglo-
Americans.
The MRS facility can be seen as counter to some traditional
teachings regarding the fundamental nature of creation. Wallace Black
Elk, an elder among the Lakota Sioux, believes that the atomic force
that binds the nucleus together is a sacred force; splitting the atom and
transmuting matter is viewed as an intrusion into the realm of God and
invites retribution.30 If nuclear power is viewed as a violation of nature,
an MRS facility would likely carry this same sense of impropriety.
Similarly, many Native Americans also consider it their duty to
protect the land because it is sacred. The land held by a tribe is an
integral component of its culture; without the land, future generations
could not develop an understanding of their identity as a people, and
their sovereignty would be threatened.
Native Americans' special concern over a nuclear-waste storage
facility arises partly because they have shouldered a disproportionate
burden for the development of nuclear technology. There is significant
evidence of radiation contamination in Native American communities
from the mining of uranium. The Navajo and the Greater Sioux
Nations show by marked increases in infant stillbirths, children born
with cleft palates, and cancer deaths. 3 1 The Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act of 199032 recognized the claims of Navajo workers
in uranium mines and those of numerous Native American victims of
radiation exposure from atomic bomb tests in Nevada. Similarly,
extensive contamination has also occurred on tribal lands adjacent to
U.S. nuclear weapons facilities. For example, the Yakima Nation in
Washington state suffered from the contamination of the Columbia
30 See Wallace Black Elk & William L. Lyon, Black EILk The Sacred Ways of a
Lakota (1990).
31 See Winona LaDuke & Ward Churchill, Native America: The Political
Economy of Radioactive Colonialism, 13 J. Ethnic Stud. 107 (1985).
32 See Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No.101-426, 104 Stat. 920
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1990)).
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River from operations at the Hanford nuclear facilities. 3 3
Contamination from nuclear activities has had clear and severe impacts
on the health of Native Americans, especially in the western U.S. An
MRS facility would suggest to many a continuation of these health
effects.
Our interviews suggest that many Sac and Fox tribal members
believed that the potential for radiation leakage from a facility would
entail significant health risks to tribal members. In contrast, the
Mescalero Apaches' perceptions of the risks from the MRS facility were
balanced by a broader focus on both the tribe's ability to manage risks
and on the benefits associated with the facility. The Mescaleros' support
for the MRS facility stemmed primarily from their focus on the
economic benefits associated with the facility. There was also a
complementary sense among many (although certainly not all) tribal
members that an MRS facility on Mescalero lands would be operated
safely. This confidence stemmed in part from the tribe's intensive study
of the nuclear waste issue and the proposed technology. Using funding
from the Negotiator's study grants, the tribe hired technical experts to
advise them on the long-run safety of an MRS facility and conducted
site visits of comparable storage facilities. 34 This information
convinced the tribal council that safe storage of spent fuel was possible
using available technology. Moreover, the tribe's chairman, Wendell
Chino, suggested that the Mescaleros could provide for an even safer
site than non-Native American communities. He argued that because
the Mescaleros have a cultural tradition of harmony with nature and
protecting the earth, the tribe was arguably a more appropriate guardian
of nuclear wastes than adherents of mainstream American culture.35
On the other hand, the Mescalero opponents of the MRS facility,
though in a minority within the tribe, voiced strong concern about the
potential risks posed by nuclear wastes to the tribe and its lands, and
questioned the tribal government's intentions and capacity in the MRS
33 See Keith Schneider, Grants Open Doors for Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan.
9, 1992, at 9.
34 See A Conversation With Miller Hudson, The Nuclear Rev., Aug. 1995, at 20.
35 See Thomas W. Lippman, Tribe Considers Nuclear Dump, N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1991, at A17; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Storage Divides Apaches and
Neighbors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1993, at A18.
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facility context. Their perceptions of risk were illustrated through a
culturally unique narrative. A leading Mescalero opponent of the MRS
facility, Rufina Laws, spoke of her dream of "glowing liquid flowing
down the slopes of the sacred Sierra Blanca, wiping out everything it
touched." 3 6 A number of Mescalero Apache tribal members accepted
this vision as evidence of the dangers posed by the MRS facility and
supported Laws in her campaign against its siting.3 7 In the end,
however, a majority of the tribe approved the MRS facility. This
iapproval seemingly endorsed the tribal council's contention that
whatever risks the facility might pose to current and future generations,
they would be outweighed by economic opportunities, in the form of
direct payments to the tribe and jobs for skilled tribal members. 3 8
This feature was key to overcoming adverse risk perceptions among the
Mescalero Apache.
Trust
As in siting contexts generally, trust was a key factor which affected
Native American support or opposition in the MRS facility context.
Trust is particularly important in the context of voluntary interactions;
for cooperative arrangements to be effective, participants need to trust
one another and feel confident that they can competently carry out
their respective roles in the transaction. 39 One of the most salient
concerns among Native Americans, which also enhanced the perceived
risk associated with the MRS facility, was a lack of trust in the ability
and willingness of the federal government to manage the facility safely.
For example, Sac and Fox opponents of the MRS facility were not
convinced that federal agencies would exercise diligence in protecting
tribal members from the risks of an MRS facility. They were also
concerned that the federal government might invoke sovereignty
arguments to abdicate responsibility to the tribe.
36 See Michael Satchell, Dances With Nuclear Waste, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Jan. 8, 1996 at 29.
37 See Leslie Linthicum, Vote Tears Rift in Tribe, Albuquerque J., Mar. 10, 1995
at Al; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Storage Divides Apaches and Neighbors, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1993, at Al8.
38 See Tony Davis, Flip-Flop on Storing Waste Shakes Up Tribe, High Country
News, May 29, 1995, at 6.
39 See Roger E. Kasperson et al., Siting Hazardous Facilities and Communicating
Risks Under Conditions of High Social Distrust, 48 J. Soc. Issues 161 (1992); Paul
Slovic, Percieved Risk, Trust and Democracy, 13 Risk Anal. 675 (1993).
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Such concerns are grounded in the historical record of Native
American interaction with the federal government, which does not
inspire confidence and is commonly termed "The Trail of Broken
Treaties." The federal government's attitudes and policies toward
Native Americans have fluctuated over the years, marked by idealism in
the post-revolutionary period, by the forcible relocation of numerous
tribes under President Andrew Jackson, by positive efforts in the 1930's
aimed at tribal government revival, and by the dissolution of the
federal-tribal relationships and land annexations which affected many
tribes in the 1950's. The historical legacy has included periods where
the Supreme Court itself was rendered impotent in enforcing verdicts
favorable to Native Americans; for example, the Marshall Court's
decision in Worcester v. Georgia was flouted with impunity under
President Jackson, and the relocation of Native American tribes, mostly
to Oklahoma, ensued. 4 0 Because of this history, it is not surprising
that Native Americans would regard the Negotiator's promises with
deep skepticism.
This lack of trust made Native American opponents of the MRS
facility suspicious of the study grants which were a central part of the
MRS siting process. For example, Sac and Fox opponents of the MRS
facility argued that it was unthinkable that the federal government
would "give away" $100,000 for a study grant with no strings attached.
They questioned the federal government even considering nuclear waste
siting on tribal lands, especially when tribes typically did not have
strong internal regulations, expertise, or enforcement mechanisms. This
lack of trust extended to other unconnected events. Sac and Fox
opponents of the MRS facility argued that the recent upgrading of the
highway which ran through the tribal headquarters from state to federal
status was an indication that the federal government was planning to
present the tribe with a fait accompli. This added to opponents'
contention that the MRS facility would not be a temporary facility and
that the process would not be truly voluntary.
In contrast, a significant feature affecting Mescaleros' support for
the MRS siting exercise was their trust in their tribal government's
40 See Rennard Strickland, Native Americans, in The Oxford Companion on the
U.S. Supreme Court (1992).
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ability to manage its ventures effectively. This was justified by the
tribe's track record of establishing flourishing enterprises that have
generated significant revenues and enhanced its economic condition.
The tribe, under the leadership of long-time chairman Wendell Chino,
runs successful ventures such as the Inn of the Mountain Gods (a casino
complex) and the Ski Apache resort, both located near Ruidoso, New
Mexico. These ventures have made the tribe comfortable with a
capitalistic orientation to economic development. Indeed, Chino has
stated that, "The Navajos make rugs, the Pueblos make pottery, and
the Mescaleros make money." 4 1 The MRS facility was viewed by the
majority of Mescalero Apaches as another opportunity to enhance the
economic status of members of the tribe. The MRS facility was even
expected to serve tribal interests better than the casino and ski resort by
providing the types of high-technology jobs that would attract
technically-trained Mescalero Apache back to the tribe for
employment. 4 2 This was expected to reduce unemployment and
further enhance the tribe's cohesiveness and self-confidence. Thus issues
of trust worked in favor of the MRS facility proposal among the
Mescalero Apache.
Procedural Equity
In order to overcome opposition to siting proposals, it is important
that the procedures used to arrive at a siting decision are perceived as
fair by all parties involved.4 3 This feature seems to have been well
understood by the Negotiator. The voluntary siting process for the
MRS facility was explicitly oriented toward addressing concerns over
procedural equity. However, in the Native American context,
procedural equity is a complex concept.
In the Sac and Fox tribe, for instance, the Negotiator's siting
process was regarded as inadequate in terms of satisfying procedural
equity. The Sac and Fox application for a study grant had been
submitted by the elected officials of the tribe, who are recognized as
the legitimate decision makers under the Indian Reorganization Act.
41 Michael Satchell, Dances With Nuclear Waste, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan.
8, 1996, at 30.
42 See id.
43 See Elaine Vaughan, The Significance of Socioeconomic and Ethnic Diversity
for the Risk Communication Process, 15 Risk Anal. 169 (1995).
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Although their actions were in accordance with the procedures
prescribed by the tribal constitution, there was concern among tribal
members that the tribe's participation in the MRS siting process had
not been discussed openly to obtain the consent of the entire tribe. This
concern crystallized in the form of a petition for a special tribal meeting
initiated by tribal member Grace Thorpe.4 4 A meeting was held in
January 1992 after the petition received the number of signatures
required by the tribal constitution. At this meeting, the tribal chairman
announced that the business council had only decided to accept an
MRS facility phase I study grant and that the tribe would withdraw
from the MRS facility siting process thereafter. After some discussion
on the issue, Grace Thorpe moved a resolution to the effect that the
tribe withdraw from the MRS facility siting process altogether. With
support from other opponents of the proposal, this resolution carried by
a substantial margin, and terminated the Sac and Fox's involvement
with the MRS facility.
The proponents of the MRS facility among the Mescalero, on the
other hand, displayed a keen appreciation for procedures and their
importance to legitimacy. The tribal council initially sponsored a
referendum in January 1995 to gain support for the venture. However,
the MRS facility proposal was defeated by a margin of 490 to 362.
Rufina Laws, a tribal member who had recently lost an election against
Wendell Chino for Tribal Chairman, received significant credit for the
defeat of the MRS facility proposal. She conducted a door-to-door
campaign against the proposal and spoke widely of her vision of
"glowing liquid flowing down the slopes of the sacred Sierra Blanca"
that spurred her to action. 45
The referendum outcome galvanized supporters of the MRS siting
proposal. Taking advantage of the tribal constitution which allowed for
a new referendum when requisitioned by two hundred tribal members,
MRS facility supporters organized a new vote on the issue. Concurrent
with this referendum were significant divisions within the tribe, with the
tribal government launching an education campaign to counter what it
alleged was misinformation about the proposal spread by non-Native
environmental activists. Under the new referendum, the proposal to
44 Daughter of the renowned Olympian Jim Thorpe.
45 See Satchell, supra note 41.
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host the nuclear waste facility passed by a margin of 593 to 372.46
Although a majority of tribal members voted in favor of proceeding
with siting an MRS facility, a significant minority harbored strong
reservations about the facility.
The Mescaleros' appreciation for the importance of procedure was
also evident in their negotiations with Northern States Power Company
in February 1994, which called for the construction of a facility on
tribal lands. Under the agreement, the facility would begin accepting
shipments in 2002 and hold spent fuel for 40 years. In return, the tribe
would receive economic benefits in the form of jobs and direct
payments, which would amount to approximately $50 million per year
over 20 years. 47 The tribe succeeded in ensuring that any MRS facility
built on Mescalero lands would be only for temporary storage by
stipulating that a Mescalero MRS facility would accept only a fraction
of the spent fuel from the utilities. Because these wastes are currently
stored on-site at reactors, this provision meant that the Mescalero MRS
facility could not become the de facto sole storage site. This provision
thus maintained the federal government's incentive to build a
permanent repository.4 8 Further, the tribe indicated that it would
accept nuclear waste only if the title to the waste remained with the
generating utility, thereby ensuring that liability would be borne by the
utility in accordance with the Price-Anderson Act. By retaining
significant control over the terms of the MRS facility, the tribe achieved
a certain degree of sanguinity in their beliefs about how well the facility
would perform.
Distributional Equity
When a community which does not benefit from nuclear power is
asked to bear the risks and burdens of nuclear waste, such an outcome
can be considered distributionally inequitable (i.e., who bears the costs
of a noxious facility and who garners the associated benefits). 4 9 The
Mescalero Apache experience presents a challenge to notions of
46 See id.
47 See Heather Border & Clyde Weiss, Tribes Signs Pact for Temporary Nuclear
Waste Dump, Las Vegas Rev. J., Feb. 5, 1994, at B6.
48 See A Conversation With Miller Hudson, The Nudear Rev., Aug. 1995 at 20.
49 See Elaine Vaughan, The Significance of Socioeconomic and Ethnic Diversity
for the Risk Communication Process, 15 Risk Anal. 169 (1995).
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distributional inequity because the tribe became an exemplar for the
promise of voluntary siting in overcoming such concerns. It freely
entered into the process, used study grants to explore the fit between
the facility and the tribe's own interests, granted all voting members a
say over the tribe's decision, and sought out alternative institutional
arrangements when Congress closed down the Office of the Nuclear
Waste Negotiator. 50 In large measure, the Mescaleros' pursuit of an
MRS facility reflected their belief that the facility would promote the
most fundamental interests of the tribe, turning a potentially
inequitable result into a net positive outcome. The benefits expected
from the MRS facility included employment opportunities for youth
who might otherwise leave the reservation and funding for much-
needed social, cultural, and educational programs. In comparison to the
existing unambiguous threats resulting from unemployment, the health
risks associated with an MRS facility appeared either trivial or
unsubstantiated to most (but certainly not all) tribal members.
Strong opposition to the MRS facility among the Sac and Fox was
voiced in spite of the obvious economic benefits associated with hosting
the facility. Opponents acknowledged that tribal members faced
serious economic hardships and that the MRS facility represented one
of the few economic-development opportunities available to the tribe.
However, these opponents attributed a number of substantial risks and
other costs to the MRS facility, and asserted that proceeding with the
MRS facility would not be in the interests of the tribe. These opponents
suggested that, in general, a "noxious" facility would be much more
acceptable if the facility had a purpose that directly served the needs of
the tribe. Since the nuclear waste was not generated by the tribe, these
opponents believed there were no intrinsic benefits or responsibility for
hosting the MRS facility. If a project had been one with a purpose that
more directly benefitted the tribe, it is possible that concerns over
distributional inequity would have been transcended. 51
50 Conversation, supra note 48, at 20.
51 As an example, these Sac and Fox tribal members noted that they were favorably
inclined toward the construction of a Juvenile Detention Center, initially for Native
American juveniles, on tribal land. This facility was viewed as having a positive purpose
for the tribe: it would generate employment and promote self-sufficiency, but more
importantly provide an opportunity for troubled children to turn their lives around.
These effects were viewed in highly positive terms and offset any potential stigma
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Policy Dilemmas Raised by the MRS Siting Experience
The diversity in Native American reactions to the MRS siting
proposal and the fact that Native American tribes are still hosting such a
facility, makes assessment of the process a complex challenge. For
example, it is difficult to criticize the process from an "environmental
justice" perspective. Environmental justice is a concept that goes beyond
the traditional focus of distributional equity, to consider explicitly
other socioeconomic aspects of distributional outcomes such as whether
the host community is predominantly minority, poor, or rural. When
siting of noxious facilities disproportionately occurs in communities
populated by racial minorities or in poor, rural communities, such an
outcome is termed environmentally unjust.52
However, the environmental justice criticism of siting outcomes
typically applies to involuntary siting situations. In contrast, the MRS
siting process was explicitly voluntary in its application. Yet critics of
the MRS facility process still criticize the process on environmental
justice grounds. They argue that building a facility such as an MRS
facility in a poor community imposes an extra burden on an already
disenfranchised population. 53 We, therefore, discuss some of the
complex questions that arise in assessing the MRS facility process from
environmental justice and other viewpoints.
How voluntary was voluntary siting ofan MRS facility on Native
American lands?
The MRS siting process, it turns out, was not unique. In the U.S.,
voluntary siting efforts have often involved Native Americans. This
tendency reflects two key conditions. First, their reservations are among
the poorest communities in the country. According to the 1990 census,
50.7% of Native Americans living on reservations have incomes below
the federal poverty level. 5 4 Because of rampant poverty, any
opportunity for economic development, including the hosting of waste-
disposal facilities, is afforded serious consideration.
associated with hosting the center.
52 See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It: Environmental Justice and
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001 (1993);
Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (Robert D. Bullard,
ed.) (1993).
53 See Dick Russell, Environmental Racism, 11 TheAmicusJ. 22 (1989).
54 See We the First Americans, U.S. Dept. of Com., Bureau of the Census (1993).
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The second factor facilitating the involvement of Native Americans
in voluntary siting efforts is tribal sovereignty. Federally recognized
tribes are treated as "sovereign nations" under law. Although each tribe
is subject to federal statutes and a complex "trustee" relationship with
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a tribe is generally not bound by the laws
of the state in which it is located. This status is particularly attractive to
facility developers, because it allows the licensing process to bypass a
number of hurdles that would otherwise be in place. Thus, interested
parties outside the reservation (e.g., state officials, residents from
nearby communities) have little, if any, influence over siting
decisions.5 5 Because of these two factors, facility developers often seek
out Native American tribes in voluntary siting efforts. 56
In practice, voluntary siting efforts have created serious
complications when applied to Native American tribes. In many cases,
the facility proposal precipitates bitter conflicts within a tribe,
exacerbating longstanding divisions between traditionalists and those
seeking modern forms of economic development. 57 Even when there
is agreement within a tribe as to the desirability of a facility, opposition
often emerges from its neighbors off the reservation, many of whom
have a history of conflict or distrust with the tribe.58 In general, waste
facilities tend to energize pre-existing schisms, both within a tribe, and
between a tribe and its non-Native American neighbors.
Although it may seem paradoxical to those who champion
voluntary siting as a procedurally fair alternative to traditional siting
55 Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother's Keepers, 78 Sierra, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 50.
56 E.g., National Disposal Systems proposed a hazardous-waste landfill for land
controlled by the Mississippi Band of the Choctaws. This facility was supported by
the chief of the tribe, but defeated in a tribal referendum. In another case, a Denver-
based firm called South Dakota Disposal Systems (SDDS) has attempted to work
with the Lower Brule Tribe in South Dakota on a plan that would allow the
development of a large municipal-waste landfill. Under the plan, land that SDDS
owns 200 miles away from the reservation would be sold to the tribe; the tribe would
then annex the land to its reservation, allowing SDDS to operate the landfill free of
state regulation. See Knox, supra note 55, at 50.
57 See Dick Russell, Dances with Waste, 13 Amicus J. 28 (1991); Knox, supra
note 55, at 50; Leslie Linthicum, Vote Tears Rif in Tribe, Albuquerque J., Mar. 10,
1995 at Al; Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind, Choctaw Reject Plan for Landfill,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1991 at A22.
58 See Robert Reinhold, Indians and Neighbors Are at Odds Over Waste Dump
on Reservation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, atAl.
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policy, many people view this process as inequitable, particularly as it
relates to locating waste facilities on tribal lands. Lance Hughes, a
member of the Creek tribe and Director of Native Americans for a
Clean Environment, decries such efforts as "toxic racism." 59 Similarly,
LaDuke and Churchill criticize the siting of an MRS facility on Native
American lands as part of a continuing pattern of "radioactive
colonialism." 6 0 These authors claim that the federal government
unilaterally abrogates treaties or annexes tribal land to exploit mineral
resources such as uranium, and that the modest royalties and
employment opportunities associated with uranium mining represented
one of the few economic development options available to tribes such as
the Navajo. In their view, the Navajo were forced into the position of
being an "economic hostage" of the uranium industry.
It appears that voluntary siting may create as many dilemmas as it
solves, at least when Native American tribes are solicited for the facility.
In particular, should poor communities have to "volunteer" for facilities
such as an MRS facility to achieve a basic level of well-being? For many,
the positive response of tribes to the Negotiator says less about the
fairness of this siting process than it does about the basic inequity in
wealth across ethnic groups. This view that tribes have been put in
situations where they need compensation and that programs such as the
MRS siting process exploit their poverty, is echoed by Susan Shown
Harjo, president of the Morning Star Foundation, a Native American
advocacy group in Washington. Harjo asserts: "Five hundred years of
colonization has done a real job on us. It makes us targets of cash and
poverty politics." 6 1 Under this view, a "voluntary" siting process
cannot be truly voluntary as long as the facility represents the only
economic hope for poor communities.
Did the MRS processfidly ensure procedural equity?
The Negotiator paid special attention to procedural equity by
insisting that relevant information be available to all concerned parties,
by stating that the MRS siting process would proceed only with
59 Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind, Choctaw Reject Plan for Landfill, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1991 at A22.
60 Winona LaDuke & Ward Churchill, Native America: The Political Economy of
Radioactive Colonialism, 13 J. of Ethnic Stud. 107 (1985).
61 Keith Schneider, Grants Open Doors for Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1992, at 9.
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community consent and through the participation of elected
representatives of communities, and by giving communities an
opportunity to withdraw at any time in the process. However, these
procedural safeguards do not work in a straightforward manner in
Native American communities. The reasons for this are both political
and cultural.
In terms of political realities within Native American tribes, even if
the Negotiator promoted an open sharing of information to candidate
communities, procedural inequity could still result from a lack of
openness within the community. In particular, some procedural-
inequity criticisms involve a lack of accountability on the part of the
individuals who serve as the official representatives of Native American
tribes - tribal councils. Lance Hughes, Director of Native Americans
for a Clean Environment argues:
There is nothing voluntary or inclusive about this process.
Most tribal citizens learn of these MRS applications in the
newspaper, if they learn of them at all, because most of
our people live under tribal government structures forced
upon us by the federal government. 62
This criticism arises from the fact that the Negotiator designated
the tribal council as the "elected representatives" of tribal members and
considered voting processes as legitimate. Both of these assumptions are
problematic in the Native American context. Tribal councils were
instituted by Congress with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to
make it easier for the Bureau of Indian Affairs to control the affairs of
tribes. The council system replaced traditional decision-making
mechanisms, e.g., consensus-based forms of government, under which
decisions were made by chiefs or other elders with the input of the
entire tribe.6 3 LaDuke and Churchill regard tribal councils as an
"alien" form of government supplanting indigenous governing
structures.6 4 They contend that aspects of the reorganization, such as
the non-recognition of community ownership in favor of nuclear family
62 Lance Hughes, Letter to the Editor Regarding a Recommendation for
Voluntary Siting, 7 Issues in Sci. & Tech. 19 (Fall 1992).
63 See Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother's Keepers, 78 Sierra, Mar./Apr. 1993, at
50.
64 LaDuke & Churchill, supra note 60.
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ownership, destroyed traditional organizational structures and
traditional resource management patterns. They also criticize tribal
councils on the grounds that their mandate to pursue economic
development actually results in dependency.
Some forms of development require Native American nations to be
willing to participate in adversarial decision-making methods rather
than traditional unitary or consensual processes. 6 5 The MRS siting
process is a case in point. There is no simple answer however, to what
constitutes a legitimate decision process within a Native American
nation. The legitimacy of decision making procedures within Native
American nations depends substantially on the traditional forms within
the nations that may vary from the autocratic to the consensual.66
Further, some tribal councils have historically failed to respond to
the will of tribal members, or even inform tribal members before
making major decisions, as one would expect in a democratic
society.67 Councils that act in this way hang onto power because many
traditionalists decline to vote in council elections, arguing that the tribal
council is not a legitimate form of governance. For tribes in which this
occurs, it is possible for the elected representatives to consent to an
MRS facility even when it offends the wishes and values that
predominate among tribal members. 6 8 However, we note that the
Negotiator did institute some provisions to address this criticism.
According to Brad Hoaglun of the Negotiator's office, "almost all of
the tribes remaining in the program will hold a tribal vote on whether or
not to submit the negotiated agreement to Congress. Tribal councils
are being encouraged by the Negotiator's office to seek a consensus
from the tribal membership." 69
65 See Diane E. Austin, Knowledge and Values in the Decision Making Around
Hazardous Waste Incineration Facilities (1993).
66 See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the
Chances of Economic Development on American Indian Reservation, in What Can
Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian Economic Development
(Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
67 See Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse (1992).
68 See Lance Hughes, Letter to the Editor Regarding a Recommendation for
Voluntary Siting, 7 Issues in Sci. & Tech. 19 (Fall 1992); Ana Radelat, Trading
Away Their Future: Will Mescalero Apaches Share Their Land with Radioactive
Waste? 13 Pub. Citizen 19 (1992).
69 Brad Hoaglun, Invited review of The Dilemma of Siting a Nuclear Waste
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Could participation have led to uninformed consent?
Even if the Negotiator and tribal councils promoted open,
informed decision making, the possibility of unwarranted consent still
remains. In particular, some argue that a startling condition of poverty
leads to distorted decision making; poor communities can't make an
informed judgment as to the appropriateness of hosting an MRS
facility, even if they know what the risks are. Ellen Long Turkey Wright
of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe (and co-founder of People for Mother
Earth Coalition) contended that the study grants "trap" a tribe into
continuing with the process. Once they have taken that money, she
worries, it will be hard for the tribes to tell the DOE to take a hike.
Wright stated, "Are we supposed to believe that the poorest
communities in the country are equipped to handle nuclear wastes?" 70
This suggests that poverty leads to uninformed decision making
(i.e., clouded judgment or decisions disconnected from one's
underlying values). However, it is also possible that the opposite might
occur. Namely, economic necessity might cause communities to take a
more careful look at the actual risks associated with a facility such as an
MRS facility, suggesting that the disparity between the decision of the
volunteer community and the opinion of outsiders might reflect a lack
of information on the part of the outsiders. The Mescalero Apaches, for
one, vigorously defended the siting process and argued that the critics,
typically Anglo-American environmentalists, were paternalistic in trying
to "protect" Native Americans against their own choices and resented
being portrayed as "dupes exploited by powerful outsiders." 7 1 They
point to the tribe's rich history, including legendary warriors like
Geronimo and Cochise, and the tribe's victories over Spanish, Mexican,
Texan, and Confederate armies, and argue that a tribe with such a
tradition will not be dictated to by outsiders, whether environmentalists
or utilities.7 2 Indeed, their response to the environmental justice
Repository communicated to Howard Kunreuther, (Washington, DC: Office of the
Nuclear Waste Negotiator, Feb. 18, 1994).
70 Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother's Keepers, 78 Sierra, 82 (Mar./Apr. 1993).
71 Miller Hudson, Public Information Director for the Mescaleros, regarded these
critics as particularly disingenuous: "There's... this sort of romantic notion, that
Indians should be captured in a time about 1890, they should stay in those
picturesque teepees and be tourist attractions rather than joining the 20th century
along with everybody else." A Conversation With Miller Hudson, The Nuclear Rev.,
Aug. 1995, at 26.
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argument is that any questioning of the tribe's decisions by outsiders is
itself racist. 73 This perspective raises basic questions about whether a
siting outcome can ever be "environmentally unjust" when it comes
from an informed choice on the part of the affected minority group.
Did the MRS siting process "target"Native American tribes?
Prima facie, the Negotiator's siting process appears to have been
remarkably progressive in achieving procedural equity. As described
.above, Leroy designed a process in which communities were free to
enter and exit the process at will. In addition, study grants were
available for local officials and residents to become familiar with the
risks and benefits of an MRS facility. Moreover, Leroy attempted to
ensure that any decision to "accept" an MRS proposal would reflect the
will of the host community; the Negotiator worked only with elected
officials (i.e., the community's legitimate representatives) and these
officials were encouraged to gauge local sentiment through referenda.
Although Leroy took considerable care in promoting procedural
equity, critics argued that the siting process was unfair in its application
to Native American tribes. A major criticism involved the special
attention that Leroy paid to tribes while seeking volunteers. 7 4 To
some, it appeared that tribes were not simply invited into the process,
but actually targeted for the facility. Such a view could be supported
either by a general distrust of the federal government's behavior toward
Native Americans (as observed among the Sac and Fox opponents of
the MRS facility) or by a more strategic analysis of the siting dilemma,
namely, tribes offered the Negotiator his only hope for success, since
every governor would be pressured to veto a state or county's interest in
hosting an MRS facility.
The Negotiator's office made efforts to counter the perception that
Natives were being targeted. When the town of Riverton, Wyoming,
applied for a study grant, the Negotiator's office sanctioned about $1
million for the town to hold a series of public meetings to demonstrate
72 See Michael Satchell, Dances With Nuclear Waste, U.S. News & World Rep,
Jan. 8, 1996, at 29.
73 See id., A Conversation with Miller Hudson, The Nuclear Rev., Aug 1995, at
20.
74 See Ana Radelat, Trading Away Their Future: Will the Mescalero Apaches
Share Their Land with Radioactive Waste? 13 Pub. Citizen 16 (1992).
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the feasibility of an MRS facility. The Mescalero Apache applicants
were not given such resources to sell the tribe. A Mescalero Apache
representative was told that the funds allocated to Riverton were to
increase the possibility of a non-Native American community's being
the site and to avoid charges of environmental racism. 7 5
The charge of "targeting" suggests inequity only if the Negotiator
were to pressure candidate communities in ways that belied their
underlying interests. In particular, targeting would certainly be
unethical if relevant MRS-related information were withheld from
tribal representatives. However, the Negotiator's study grants allowed
tribes to hire independent consultants with considerable expertise about
the operation and risks of an MRS facility. The Mescalero Apaches, for
example, gained substantial technical knowledge about the
management of nuclear wastes.
Most importantly, however, there is a question about whether the
process used by the Negotiator was fundamentally unfair. The
Negotiator took pains to point out that participants could withdraw
from the MRS siting process at any time. The process also provided a
veto to state governors over county decisions to participate in the MRS
siting process. Given the high level of concern over nuclear waste risks
across the U.S., 7 6 it can be assumed that governors would veto a
nuclear waste facility in their states rather than deal with the political
fallout. Therefore, while the governor veto provision can be
commended as fair, this feature also possibly ensured that the only
participants in the MRS siting process would be Native American tribes,
as tribal sovereignty ensured that they were the only parties not subject
to governors' vetoes. If it could have been reasonably predicted that this
would be the outcome, then this seemingly fair voluntary procedure
could be argued to be a ruse designed to involve Native American
communities in the MRS siting process.
Did the process deal adequately with culturalperspectives and impacts
on cultural values?
Another set of challenges that the MRS siting process in Native
America presents concerns the issue of cultural perspectives and impacts
75 See A Conversation with Miller Hudson, The Nuclear Rev., Aug. 1995, at 20.
76 See Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste, (Riley E. Dunlap et al., eds.) (1993).
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on cultural values. It is certainly not clear that such culture-related
aspects have been studied in any significant manner, especially not by
the Nuclear Waste Negotiator. For example, for many Native
Americans, any degradation to tribal lands is a threat because life is
viewed holistically. Whereas mainstream American thinking allows for
the sacrifice of a portion of the environment for economic purposes,
Native Americans often reject such trade-offs on the grounds that all
environmental resources are equally essential. 7 7 This cultural
perspective runs counter to the economic rationale underlying voluntary
siting - that tradeoffs are possible between risks and benefits of various
land uses.
However, the experiences and beliefs reported here apply
differently across Native American tribes. For example, the leaders of
the Mescalero Apache clearly believed that whatever risks were
associated with nuclear waste could be safely and morally contained
using MRS technology. In contrast, members of the Sac and Fox
Nation viewed the MRS facility as threatening the health of future
generations (e.g., through mutations). Further, the risks applied not just
to individuals, but also to the tribe as an ongoing cultural entity;
because of the relatively small number of tribal members, radiation
contamination from the facility could potentially result in the
annihilation of the entire tribe.
Clearly, concerns about the MRS facility will vary substantially
among Native Americans, both among tribes and within any given tribe
and will be affected by traditional cultural perspectives. It is not
apparent that the Negotiator and the concept of voluntary siting could
integrate these alternative cultural perspectives without raising conflicts
which would potentially doom the MRS siting process.
Did the MRS process legitimize entrepreneurial management ofa
risky facility?
The voluntary siting process for the MRS facility may have actually
raised new questions in the context of nuclear waste management.
While achieving a site is a central goal of siting processes generally and
of the voluntary approach in particular, it is far from clear that any
77 See Richard W. Stoffle & Michael J. Evans, Holistic Conservation and Cultural
Triage: American Indian Perspectives on Cultural Resources, 49 Hum. Org. 91
(1990).
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volunteer site would necessarily be appropriate to handle nuclear wastes.
The risks to health, safety, and the environment posed by nuclear
wastes are so enormous that it is not readily apparent that such wastes
should be managed by any other than an exceptionally technically
qualified entity, for example, the federal government. However, the
MRS process legitimized the notion that nuclear wastes could be
managed by any party that volunteers to do so, thus opening the door
for private transactions between tribes and utility companies which can
be potentially problematic. Such entrepreneurial management of
nuclear wastes is a potential reality, as can be seen from the Mescalero
Apache's and Skull Valley Goshute's negotiations with the Northern
States Power utility company to host part of the utility's nuclear wastes.
But such transactions, while voluntary, do not consider adverse
impacts on neighboring communities. In tribal cases, there is no need to
consider the views of neighboring communities as they do not have
jurisdiction over what happens on tribal lands. However, this is
problematic in cases such as those involving Oklahoma tribes because,
rather than being a contiguous reservation, tribal land is often a
patchwork interspersed with non-Native owned land. In New Mexico,
non-Mescalero residents (particularly residents of the town of Ruidoso)
argue that an MRS facility on the Mescalero Apache reservation would
negatively affect their health and economic livelihood. Leroy's MRS
siting process did not require consent from these affected third parties,
although state officials do retain some jurisdiction over the
transportation of wastes within New Mexico. 78
Another problem associated with the entrepreneurial and voluntary
management of nuclear wastes centers on the issue of liability. In their
negotiations with Northern States Power, the Mescalero Apache were
careful to insist that the title to the wastes would remain with the
utility. This ensures that any liabilities arising from nuclear waste
related damages would be borne by the utility to some extent and then
by the federal government, in accordance with the Price-Anderson Act
which limits the liability of nuclear energy generators. The absence of
78 Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the authority to regulate the
proposed facility, state officials are likely to attempt to impose restrictions on the
storage and transportation of spent fuel within the state. It is currently unclear whether
a state has the legal authority or effective ability to prevent the construction of an
MRS facility on a reservation.
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liability might adversely affect the waste-managing tribe's incentives to
take appropriate care of nuclear wastes.
The market-like transactions involved in the MRS process led Sac
and Fox opponents to believe that ultimately the federal government
would transfer liability, raising the possibility that they could be
bankrupted in case of an accident. They also feared that the federal
government would fail to ensure that the facility would adhere to the
stringent safety standards established by agencies, such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy, abdicating
such responsibilities to the volunteer host. Opponents justified their
fears on the track record of federal "caretaking" of Native American
interests. In the end, Leroy lost much credibility among the Sac and
Fox, for example, simply because he was a representative of the federal
government. In fact, some respondents attributed nefarious intentions
to his actions; they viewed his Office as a way for the federal
government to put a hazardous facility to tribal lands, while claiming
that the decision had been made "legitimately," 7 9 through a
voluntary, market-like transaction.
Conclusion
While many have criticized David Leroy's voluntary approach to
siting an MRS facility, on the grounds of both equity and effectiveness,
others have applauded his process as a progressive alternative to the
heavy-handed siting that has come to characterize the federal
government's nuclear waste program.80 When compared to Congress's
unilateral decision in 1987 to designate Yucca Mountain as the
presumptive site for an underground repository, Leroy's principle of
giving communities free rein to enter into and exit out of the siting
process appears highly democratic. Still, legitimate concerns persist as
to whether "allowing" tribes to volunteer for a nuclear-waste facility is
the fairest approach, given the long-standing inequities in wealth,
particularly when those inequities are (at least in part) the consequence
of treaty abrogations on the part of the federal government.
79 Among the Mescalero, this mistrust was overridden by belief that the tribe could
control the negotiations with the federal government.
80 See Doug Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-
Level Nuclear Waste Repository (1995); Conversation, supra note 75, at 20.
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Even if one concludes that the nuclear waste Negotiator offered an
equitable approach to siting an MRS facility, it is unclear whether it
offered a "solution" in the sense of finding viable host communities. By
the time the Negotiator's term expired in 1994, the only jurisdictions
still considering a federal MRS facility were the Skull Valley Goshute
Tribe, the Fort McDermitt Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, and the Tonkawa
Tribe. It is unclear whether any of these three tribes would have
progressed to the point of negotiating a siting agreement, and if so,
whether state or federal officials would have allowed the agreement to
become effective. 8 1
The fact that so many tribes (like their non-Native American
counterparts) dropped out of the siting process suggests that the
potential for benefits could not overcome the variety of perceived risks
associated with hosting an MRS facility. The facility appeared to
involve highly uncertain consequences affecting the health of tribal
members, the environment, and the tribe's economy, sovereignty and
survivability. Furthermore, these threats were not offset by any
countervailing impetus to build an MRS facility on tribal lands;
monetary benefits did not appear able to compensate for the potential
damage that might occur to irreplaceable environmental, human, and
cultural resources. And just as importantly, no tribe felt an imperative
to solve the nuclear-waste dilemma (i.e., to build an MRS facility for
intrinsic reasons).
Yet, the most fundamental obstacle to finding a voluntary site for
an MRS facility may really be a lack of interest in problem solving. The
vast majority of Americans do not feel a personal responsibility toward
solving the high - level waste problem and see no compelling reason to
host an MRS facility. Particularly, Native American tribes have very
little stake in solving the nuclear-waste problem, because reactors are
owned and operated by public and private utilities. The fundamental
81 Although Leroy was clearly motivated by a desire to build an MRS facility, this
was not his highest priority. Throughout his tenure, Leroy contended that he was
more committed to maintaining a credible and open process than he was to coming
back to Congress with a volunteer state or tribe. He referred to himself as "the
guardian of the process, rather than the guarantor of the result." David H. Leroy,
Moving Beyond the Headlines: Negotiated Nuclear Facility Siting in the 1990's,
speech to the 2d Ann. Int'l High Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference
(Las Vegas, NV, Apr. 30, 1991).
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equity issue is whether society's interests are best served by a siting
policy that transfers the burden of solving the nuclear waste problem
away from waste generators and onto poor communities, even if those
communities achieve greater "wealth" in the process.
Out of all the Native American reactions to the MRS siting
proposal, responses such as those of the Mescalero Apache raise the
most interesting points about voluntary siting and its efficacy. On its
face, this experience shows that voluntary siting efforts can be effective
and it shows what features make such efforts successful. The most
significant insights from the Mescalero Apache experience are the
questions it raises about our understanding of distributional equity and
environmental justice. Who decides what is distributionally inequitable
and environmentally unjust remains an open question, as does the
question of whether voluntary siting is truly voluntary when considered
in the context of the imperatives of Native American tribes.
